爱德华哈达

对高管薪酬的辩论往往只是一个互相对骂，部分原因是，有没有什么实际支付给老板做的协议。 “股东价值”的方法提供了一个简单的答案，但是，这是双方实际和道义上是错误的。亚里士多德有更好的想法。

最近，花旗集团的股东投了反对票，银行的首席执行官潘伟迪（Vikram Pandit）的薪酬包。在欧洲，巴克莱银行，瑞士信贷，英杰华，曼氏集团和Xstrata的议会是在同样热水。许多人认为，关键是要成功的奖励挂钩。但究竟是什么企业的成功是什么意思？什么是支付做潘迪特？

在现代公司的标准认为，潘伟迪最终只会股东们对他的报酬投票。公司的合法拥有者选择一个董事会，代表他们的利益。董事会聘用行政长官创造“股东价值” - 也就是说，股息和更高的股价。股东有权利生气，如果管理者服务本身，而不是他们的最终老板。

股东价值的角度提供了一个简单的方法来思考企业，但它既不真也不只是。在实践中，现代企业不执行股东的利益。也不应。

词源提供了一个有用的提示。团“一词来源于”文集“，拉丁身体。股东是一个重要的器官，要维持企业的生命。但正如没有很多的健康器官的身体无法生存，企业依靠许多团体。股东的过度关注会导致萎缩或公司其他器官的疾病 - 员工，机械，办公室 - 无法应付企业环境 - 供应商，客户，政府和广大市民。

在花旗集团的情况下，美元的股东资金181亿元，确实是至关重要的，但其他的1.8万亿美元左右的资产负债表。所以有26万员工，数以百万计的客户，在银行经营的法律制度 - 作为近期的金融危机清楚 - 政治家和监管。而企业往往在客观条件描述，但它们和人运行。他们都应该得到公正的待遇。

促进正义，那么，是潘迪特的工作的重要组成部分。但是，什么是正义？为企业，它是有帮助的学习，从亚里士多德方法 。古希腊哲学家认为，只是每个参与的人收到回报的比例到他或她的优点是当一个组织。股东在公司中，有提供资金的优点，主要行政人员给领导的专业知识，员工的优点是时间和技能，等等。

亚里士多德企业司法将永远是相当粗糙的，因为它是不可能完全准确地追踪特殊贡献的影响。此外，今天的成功，可以成为明天的失败。在这种无知的雾，它可能会更好依靠另一个亚里士多德的原则 - 适度。给股东，老板或任何其他组的回报，这是极高或极低的，这是不公正的。

然而，无论是在公司的标准视图的正义也不节制功能。拉拉队的股东价值主张，在企业的生命，只有一件事事项：从这里到永恒的股权投资者的利润。但是，判断依赖于两个假设显然是虚假的。首先，未来可预期的准确，第二，股东永远不会牺牲长期良好的短期利益着想。

直到大约1980年，股东价值理论在实践中几乎被忽略。经理人大多从事什么通常被称为利益相关者资本主义。他们的需求，愿望和能力的企业身体的各个器官的平衡。他们认识到，企业的成功，有许多方面。利润是在名单上，伴随着更好的产品和服务，保护环境的责任，服务社会和员工福利。

虽然在过去的几十年中，股东的利益，已成为卓越。其结果是企业成功的道义上的贫困。股东价值被调用在高管薪酬高和低的劳动者工资的争论。它是用来为借口鲁莽的金融结构和回避的欺骗性广告和有害产品的批评。

潘迪特，共同在最高层，可能值得少 - 没有什么股价已经完成或股东认为。此外，更广泛和更道德的定义的企业宗旨是更好的公司治理的一个先决条件。当然，利益相关者资本主义，现在公认的英国公司法，应更换股东价值。但是，议会和老板仍需要更多思考的复杂性，保持良好健康的团体。公司正义是动态的，不同的群体，值得或多或少在不同的时间。

为股东，其资本是至关重要的，是他们喜欢的食物，保持企业的生物体活着的利润。然而，企业应该有其他股东脂肪比更高的目标。最近从天主教宗座正义与和平委员会的文件的话，“一个有机体必须吃，但不是其存在的首要目的。利润是个好仆人，但它使一个贫穷的主人。“

托马斯·卡莱尔的严词指责，对工厂造成的精神损害赔偿是近两个世纪的历史，但情绪是当前地方工业化是猖獗。巨大的恶魔“的机制，”他写道，“吸烟和打雷，气喘吁吁地在他的伟大任务，oversetting整个众人的工人......所以，最明智的不再知道他的下落。”

在中国，今天，政府领导人和持不同政见者都担心，作为一个评论家所说的那样，“对美好生活的疯狂竞争[] lobotomized的内在价值，如共同正派，同情和感情相交的人”。

一个世纪前，马克斯·韦伯“觉醒”的过程。德国社会学家认为，从狭隘的和官僚的“铁笼”的现代文明的信仰和农业文化的过渡需要一种精神的世界观的破坏。他看到了一个现代社会的“专家没有精神，没有的心脏sensualists”。

韦伯是肯定的东西：工业化不打破旧的宗教方式。前工业社会的超越和日常生活紧密地交织在一起。社会礼仪不能脱离道德的期望。这种团结是不可能的材料很多，大城市和高科技的世界。

广大增加财富，消费和教育创造了个人表达的机会和消除经济上的理由为许多社会经济宗教的限制。城市化带来了人们身体接近，但往往作为匿名的邻居，而不是在共同价值观的社区。无所不在的媒体，电讯和交通削弱家庭或村的'我们'和'他们'的外部世界之间的边界。旧的宗教和精神的方式，无法生存这一过渡。

但是，凯雷，韦伯和许多现代社会观察家做出大胆的索赔：共同的宗教信仰和共同的道德价值观已经一去不复返了，现代社会有没有老式的确定性的房间， 所谓的 “世俗时代，没有什么哲学家查尔斯·泰勒的退出“。

是他们的权利？在一个富裕的经济，缓解严峻的生存斗争，并有更多的情感和宗教的探索时间。现代科学知识，邀请投机和奇迹。正如韦伯所指出的，纪律的精神是“世俗禁欲主义”，这使得现代经济生产的需要。繁荣和城市化进程可能使人产生更大的灵性。

卡尔·马克思 “虚幻幸福的人”的宗教和共享的道德谴责。他的案件被削弱，替代他的失败。反对马克思主义者往往理想化，但在自己的统治权力的低效和残忍。他们的经济正义的承诺，这将使生活满足现在听起来像一个糟糕的玩笑。

而马克思主义一直是一位杰出的失败，更成功的现代同行失败的转换大家政教分离。民主是需要的，但很难鼓舞人心的，没有必要去中国旅行，听到有关过度唯物论，自私和浅薄的投诉。在限制较少的国家，对自由的赞美是经常配合的媒体，政府和全社会的暴政的投诉。

相对较少的人似乎使繁荣的服务精神的目的。世俗化和工业化已经走到了一起，大多是超越世俗之交的不可分割的组成部分。出现不可抗拒的高消费和个人自由的现代包装的老办法的损失，即使有时遗憾。

但事实并不为永久根治世俗的情况下支持。虽然宗教在世界许多地方，它是很难了。在许多国家，工业化和繁荣似乎滋养伊斯兰教。即使是基督教，宗教首先由工业化和城市化的威胁，没有做不好日益无神论的欧洲以外。在中国，对土著和进口的精神教义的快速增长，应设置在一个道德指南针损失的悲叹。新的中产阶级似乎是特别热心。

更根本的是，宗教和道德问题，是人性的问题。希望找到更高，更比任何物理世界提供某些东西是如何强大，如何普及？

答案是不会改变工业化的发病。组织周围的旧的经济模式，社会关系和民间信仰的宗教习俗会消亡，但这种下降可以由精神组织的成长和发展与城市化，工业化，社会适应的道德标准。在中国投资银行家的话，“有意义的生活的愿望不走，只是因为我很有钱”。他已花费更多的时间在一个佛教寺庙。

的发展目标是什么？标准答案是高国内生产总值（GDP）。一些专家喜欢谈论建设的能力。我还有一个想法：发展应是素质，一个中国字，通常翻译为质量。

很长一段时间，中国一直担心发展。如何克服人的落后，而不会失去什么是真正的伟大和有关中东王国的独特按倒在19世纪的改革者。他们看到了发展，现在它叫，涉及文化和社会的重大改造。它涵盖了经济，教育，法律，政治，军事，艺术和医药。

今天的国际社会已采取了更窄的理解。贫穷国家的领导人，并在该领域的专家支付通常认为的发展对经济增长的中心。社会和文化的变化被视为工具，以帮助提高国内生产总值比。

更复杂的方法是“能力的方法”。阿马蒂亚·森，哲学头脑的经济学家认为 ，穷国应该开发什么功能都需要为他们的居民是免费的。他对自由的想法是多方面的：它包括免于饥饿，早产儿死亡率，文盲，政治权利被剥夺和审查。

但能力的方法有一些缺陷。首先，它假定，发展的最终目标是个人主义，世俗和民主的福利国家，在欧洲和美国发现的。

这放肆，可能有其他的方法，是在现代世界的文明。第二，强调自由，忽略了事实上，它往往需要克服愚昧，迷信和肮脏的强制位。最后，它留下没有地方可去，一旦所有这些能力已达到。

这就是李素芝，意思是“基本”和“自然”的字符组成一个字来。无所不包的财富，健康，教育，精致和贵族的性格，它已成为在中国讨论有关社会的关键概念。

有低李素芝向后 - 认为，像一个农民。政府曾试图以提高中国的限制生育和促进母乳喂养，健康的运动，并减少考试为中心的教育素质。个人试图提高自己做好考试，成为现代消费者和寻求精神的自我完善李素芝。具有较高的李素芝是什么西方人将之形容为“一个好人”。

随着收入的增加和视野开阔的概念发展下去。李素芝总是可以步步高升。这对落后的斗争中，繁荣，是不是最终目标，尽管它提供的手段来提高素质。

澳大利亚国立大学的Andrew Kipnis 给 “哈佛女孩刘亦婷的例子真纪事：李素芝培养的。这个中国最畅销书-售出200万份， 根据出版商-解释如何一个女孩的素质是如此彻底地栽培，她作为一个哈佛大学本科接受。她的的李素芝建设演习包括古典诗歌记忆三​​岁，持有时间在15分钟的冰块，并学习正确的道德态度。

在中国并非每个人都热衷于追求的素质。 kipnis还提到一本书，叫我平均水平，但我很高兴。政府试图缓和狂热的素质，寻求中国的父母。

与此同时，一些视中国为借口威权招素质的重点。热门博主韩寒激起了争议，他的说法，中国的李素芝是尚未高到足以支持一个成功的和稳定的民主国家。

其他观察员抱怨说，对素质的重点是肤浅和唯物主义。如果有些人认为有更高李素芝性质，如果富人似乎有更多的机会，培养，它可以是社会分化。

但这些都不是真的对李素芝本身的参数，我们如何衡量它的批评，或为它而努力。他们不改变，素质是中国领导人和人民要发展的意识。这是很难想象的另一个指导原则，在物质和社会野心，政府指导和个人主义的精神，自我提高的信心和与传统价值观的复杂关系。

虽然素质特别是中国到现在为止一直是普遍适用的基本理念 - 成为一个更好的人 - 。每一个贫穷的国家，应该找到自己的李素芝。和丰富的国家，甚至可以做一个有关价值观和愿望的辩论。亚洲词似乎适合这个全球性的概念，该地区很可能是世世代代发展中心。

经济学家们可能会不开心，如果素质成为研究的中心。其简单的措施，国内生产总值，将获得较少受到关注。此外，经济学家们喜欢来衡量的东西，和素质是不是数量，而是改变收集的素质。但随后，发展是太重要了，留给经济学家。

作为一个口号，“三个代表”是令人费解。它是在2000年，江泽民决定，一次革命的中国共产党将随着其传统选区（“先进文化”）的知识分子和工人代表 ，私营部门，他称之为“先进生产力”;（“绝大多数人“）。

江泽民2000年的战略，那么中共的总书记，并装订成特有的中国政治制度，促进共同利益。面临的挑战是要确保国家的单一政治力量并没有失去与该国的经济日益多元化的触摸。一直列入资产阶级商人和资本家抓党的可靠和有效地在一个贫穷的和思想上的伤痕累累的国家。但作为中国留下的贫穷落后，其领导人需要担心更多比单纯的物质繁荣。的时间已经到了一个更广泛的国家议程的计划 - 从“三个代表”的举动，“三个代表”五职责。

首先，中国必须履行的责任它的过去。对于过去的两个世纪中，许多中国领导人已经看到自己的家园，为落后。他们热情地抛开思想和理想 - 直到大约1700 - 中国文化那么复杂，它的哲学如此深刻，如此令人印象深刻的政府。

一个新的“复兴之路”在北京中国国家博物馆参观展览表明，天真的马克思主义的阶级斗争和革命英雄主义的生活叙事。当然，不应该采取这样的宣传，在票面价值，但过去的更诚实和乐于助人的看法是可能和可取的。政府将努力维护知识产权的合法性，如果它依赖于这样一个历史的狭隘的眼光。

其次，政府有责任建立一个更加一致的对西方的态度，作为中国人常称一切已出现来自欧洲的传统。经投这么多的中国的过去，中共经常接受西方国家的技术标准制定者，法律，教育和文化。随着国家变得更加成功，这将需要复制和发展其自身的现代版本。

这个责任方面最迫切的​​是反思西方的观念已被遗弃在其家乡。共产党人认为，一个先进的国家已经没有需要允许政治反对派或组织，不与政府紧密合作，一致。不必保持党的奴役这个坏主意。即使一党政府仍然是神圣不可侵犯的，不信任的民间社会，这使得它难以活动家，艺术家和宗教团体的蓬勃发展，值得反思。

第三，中国共产党有责任发展的非经济精英，江泽民的“先进文化”。虽然中共丢弃最老的想法，它继续前中国共产主义信念，知识分子和精神领袖应该发挥重要作用，在国家议程设置。但在过去十年中，中国的精英似乎有腐烂。钱商业气息和技术思维的胜利，在牺牲的想象力和道德榜样设置。

四是老百姓，江泽民的“压倒性多数”的责任。中国共产党为人民，特别是在经济问题上，做了不错的工作。尽管如此，仍有大量的工作要做，不仅进一步增加财富。政府应作出以下学历的机械，退一步从执行计划生育和搞活大多是单调的新的城市大片。

最终的责任是环境。这已经在很大程度上被忽视急于提高生活水平。但现在，中国是不够丰富，会做清洁的空气和水这些标准比增加生产。爱护环境，可以被看作是其他四项职责的高潮。在中国传统宗教，对自然世界的尊重是至关重要的。重振这一传统可以帮助中国提高对西方的技术集成与生产环境的关注。它需要从一个坚定的和诚实的精英，有纪律的人民的支持。

从“三个代表责任的过渡，只能面对一个马克思主义者可能致电中共内部矛盾。它不能进一步发展而放弃其创始原则，狭隘的唯物主义的世界观。 “和谐发展”，口号的继任者江泽民，胡锦涛，有隐约的精神，以环，但不能克服的矛盾。

中国共产党是聪明的，足够的领导从毛泽东思想的恢复和避免前苏联的衰变。尽管很多腐败，但它仍然社仓会使任何西方政党的绿色羡慕的人的尊重和信任的水平。也许成功胡锦涛今年晚些时候，习近平，将定义一个党，这是负责任的，足以让中国不仅更加繁荣，但也更美好的社会，其人民值得。

“慈善是冷的，灰色的，无情的事情。如果一个富人要帮助穷人，他 ​​欣然应支付他的税，而不是施舍钱随意。“克莱门特·艾德礼写道 ，在1920年。二战后，英国首相艾德礼转身认为政策。他帮助建立了福利国家已经消灭穷人的私人慈善机构。

这是大致相同的，在所有富裕国家。政府现在采取的首要责任照顾穷人。即使在美国，慈善（自愿）部门是比较大的-两倍高占GDP的比重作为在英国，根据英国慈善公益 -由联邦和各州的福利计划，采取占GDP的比重，作为衡量经合组织是高出10倍。

但是，艾德礼的判决已被证明是错误的。如果有组织的慈善事业是冷的，仔细校准的支付和福利国家的权利是冰冷的。福利国家，有很多方面，但它在减轻痛苦方面没有奏效如预期。下降 - 饥饿和自愿无家可归和电力，电话和蔓延 - 否则可能会建议。但在整体的繁荣和建立一个“活工资”，而不是政府权利的机制，原则增加，造成这些变化。

在任何情况下，艾德礼和他的盟友认为，福利国家可以做更多的事情，不仅仅是从门保持狼。他们认为这可能会破坏奥斯卡·刘易斯后来称之为 “贫困文化”。人类学家谈到“一个边缘化的强烈的感觉，无奈，依赖，不属于”。

但是，无产阶级和农民的下降而减少，贫困文化生活的富裕国家的人口比例，福利国家有增加的趋势边缘化和那些依赖。他们住在自己的世界，依赖于政府计划和不负责任的奖励。

我曾听到孩子“得到报酬”，如果他们的母亲的懒惰是一种工作在福利依赖家庭谈话。像这样在扶贫系统的许多家庭，有没有父亲。这样的单亲家庭的增加，不能完全归咎于福利的情况，但这种支付使反社会行为，容易得多。

艾德礼被告被无情的慈善机构，但接受政府的钱，经历了一个深刻的异化中的福利国家的官僚结构。护理专业人员有表格填写，配额，以满足和法规遵守。但是他们的意图，他们无法避免行政密码当作他们的客户。双方都没有捆绑，由慈善机构，而是一个客观的冷墙隔开。

为社会，其结果是灾难性的。太多的儿童福利的家庭，最终成为福利依赖的成年人，或在监狱中。利益的人太多，不能出现半永久性失业，或滥用药物。

这是时间给自愿的帮助下，免费的慈善精神，一个新的机会。如果国家将退出，将会有更少的规则;更多的机会与有需要的个人关系的发展，以及出于一个更高的组织更多的空间，无论是宗教或慈善事业。

它不会很容易，以减少政府的作用在已扩张的时代。但是，共产主义垮台后，国有经济控制的崩溃，可以作为一个有用的先例。不需要重复这一转变的创伤和腐败。我们需要的是缓慢的反贫穷计划和精心策划的私有化。

第一步将是，使各政府机构更像是国家资助的不以营利为目的的公司。一个新的法律和行政地位，使政府更容易完全分离。

逐步撤离将遵循。捐款将取代超过十年左右的税收。人们会大方;他们将支付的税款少，可以说服他们的礼物，将帮助有需要的人士。这是一个比喂官僚系统更加诱人的前景。在分配方面，规定可以放宽比例与私人资金的到来。竞争也应发挥作用。随着国家的货币流动减少，外人可能接管由前国家机构。

慈善安排在年底，可能会提供更少的钱，比国家的覆盖范围和少的肯定。但也未必是一件坏事。贫穷的文化将是缺乏吸引力，如果它是不舒服。和适度资助的慈善文化，而不会是能够负担得起的艾德礼的梦想精心校准的援助，它可以提供他们真正需要的贫困：慈善燃烧的火。和慈善事业，毕竟，是另一种爱字。

The euro zone debt crisis shows that something is seriously wrong with Europe. But what is it?

Most financial professionals think the problem is economic. They have long considered continental Europe something of a mess – slow GDP growth, inept governments, smothering regulation and a culture that doesn't “get” markets. European residents seem equally gloomy, especially about the economy. In the most recent Eurobarometer survey, 71 percent of respondents did not expect the crisis to be over two years hence.

The economic worries of both financiers and citizens are misplaced. Even if the slow patch does last a few more years, the European economy will continue to do what a modern economy is supposed to do. European consumers are basically as well off as Americans after adjusting for longer European holidays and different lifestyle choices. There is probably greater justice in the distribution of incomes and consumer goods in Europe than in the United States. The euro zone's low trade deficits – less in total since 1990 than the United States ran in the last six months – suggest that Europe is globally competitive. Europe probably has a worse unemployment problem than the United States, but national governments are belatedly trying to remedy that.

Where Europe is really weak is not in economics but politics. A lack of political cohesion turned relatively minor financial problems – one small reprobate government (Greece) and two small careless ones (Portugal and Ireland) – into a disproportionately large struggle to avoid a devastating financial meltdown. Despite the risk, politicians and bureaucrats spent years bickering. They may have finally found the necessary toughness and solidarity, but there are enough unanswered questions to suggest that further crises are a lively possibility.

The indecision and discord needs to be kept in proportion. Politically, Europe is far more stable than it was a century ago, when a much smaller trigger set off the First World War. It is more unified – fiscally and financially – than it was in that war's aftermath, when the anti-solidarity policy of reparations and the anti-flexibility of the gold standard wreaked havoc.

Still, Europe could do better. I suggest a three-pronged effort to make the region stronger.

The first is supposedly underway: balanced national budgets in normal economic times. An earlier effort to mandate this, the Stability and Growth Pact, failed, but the intervening crisis may have concentrated minds and strengthened resolve. If it hasn't, then the euro project is liable to topple over as soon as economic challenges arrive.

Second, national politicians and the European Central Bank should agree – and state it publicly in no uncertain words – that the fiscal compact implies that the cost of future national fiscal failures will be shared between debtor and creditor nations. There will always be disputes about how to apportion the losses, but those can be resolved if everyone accepts the principle of shared responsibility. A bad loan is a sign that both sides messed up. A multi-country currency union cannot survive without solidarity among its members.

Third, Europe needs to make the economy the servant of something greater, something with more political resonance than a prosperity pact. A merely materialist agreement will always be vulnerable to economic downturns.

Half a century ago, when the predecessor to the European Union was founded, there was a good reason to emphasise economic unity: other sorts of multi-national convergence were much more challenging. Europe is not like the United States, which can boast of a single “American way of life” both culturally and politically. (US states' rights were effectively crushed 150 years ago in the Civil War.) Nor is Europe like China, which established a national language and culture three millennia ago.

On the contrary, European nations have basically been moving apart for centuries, developing their own national languages and cultures. The nations often behaved like teenage gang members, convinced of their own superiority and always up for a mutually destructive fight.

After the biggest fight, World War Two, the peacemakers followed their profession's best practice: build trust by focusing on a common effort in the least controversial area – the economy. It has worked, although almost every step has been difficult. The last step, the merger of monetary and fiscal policies, proved traumatic.

But after 60 years of economic success, it should be clear that greater unity need not destroy national diversity. Italians may never be as much like Germans as New Yorkers are like Californians, or as Shanghainese are like Beijingers. But Europeans should be able to find enough common ground – if only as an entity able to hold its own against the United States and China – to give the EU stronger support than mere economic self-interest. If not, there really will be something wrong with Europe.

The first anniversary of Japan's nuclear disaster is a good time to take stock. Opponents and proponents of nuclear power are doing so, and they have come to the same conclusion: “We were right all along.”

The meltdown at the Fukushima power plant is certainly grist for the mill of the anti-nuclear crowd. It forced the evacuation of 300,000 people and will cost as much as $250 billion to clean up, according to the Japan Center for Economic Research. If a natural disaster can trigger such a dangerous, disruptive and expensive crisis in a country as advanced as Japan, then it's impossible to guarantee safety anywhere. Efforts to do the impossible will make nuclear power even more expensive and, by some analyses including that of the Worldwatch Institute , it already costs more than solar energy.

The technical and economic data, though, may offer less support for the anti-nuclear brigade than the images from Fukushima, including explosions, mass evacuations to escape the deadly and invisible threat of radiation, and workers in white safety suits. The pictures reinforce the visceral fear that radioactivity is just too hot to handle.

Proponents of nuclear plants haven't exactly been comforted by Fukushima, but they argue that a cool look at the situation actually supports their case. After all, the damage from a near worst-case scenario at a badly managed, ageing plant is proving to be quite bearable. This case is strengthened by the Japanese government's minimum estimate of direct clean up costs – something like $15 billion, spread out over several years. That's less than 10 percent of the highest estimates of damage, and of the expected non-nuclear cost of the earthquake and tsunami which overwhelmed the Fukushima plant.

Besides, the pro-nukes say, the affected plant was too old to be relevant for future investment decisions. New plants are safer by design. Fukushima won't significantly alter the result of the studies promoted by the World Nuclear Association, which conclude that atomic energy is relatively cheap. Enthusiasts, who have always dismissed atomic phobia as illogical and exaggerated, are quick to point out that Fukushima has nothing to do with Hiroshima. The chain of activities required to generate, say, coal-fired power can be shown to cost more lives, too.

What Fukushima really teaches is that the gap between the two sides of the nuclear argument is too wide to be bridged by evidence. Whatever happens, many opponents will always see an intrinsically dangerous technology which people should not try to tame. And however expensive the last plant or accident, most proponents will continue to believe that nuclear power is a wonderful technology, needed for humanity's long-term comfort, and with risks that can be managed.

I think the factual arguments hide a deeply philosophical disagreement– about just how much control man can and should have over the hidden forces of nature. The same fundamental discord embitters arguments about global warming , biotechnology, assisted reproductive technology and the population the earth can durably sustain. In such heartfelt debates, facts and pseudo-facts are sought largely as weapons to be thrown at the other side. Fukushima seems to provide a fair supply.

The philosophical issue is important. There are surely technologies which really do cross a fairly clear moral line, and the natural world should not be exploited blindly. But nuclear power is no longer an appropriate field for this ideological combat.

That was not always the case. In the 1950s, the destructive power of atomic fission was clear, while the human ability to make it beneficial was not. After more than a half-century of operating nuclear plants with only a few accidents – none of them killing as many people as the 1984 explosion at the Bhopal chemical factory in India – it's no longer appropriate to consider this technology as beyond the moral pale.

On the other hand, nuclear costs have consistently failed to plummet as predicted for the past 50-plus years. So the technology cannot be considered a potential wonder-cure for energy woes. It is never going to live up to a US promoter's 1954 dream that it would be “too cheap to meter”.

How does nuclear power look once it is freed from the weight of ideology and dreams? Neither clearly better nor clearly worse than gas, coal or solar. It's certainly competitive, thanks largely to low operating costs – uranium is much cheaper than coal or oil – but comparisons that consider all types of associated expenses are inevitably highly subjective. The problem is ignorance of the future.

Nuclear plants last four to six decades, far too long for accurate predictions of fuel prices and technological developments. They are a diversifier away from coal, oil and gas generation. But there's no way to foresee, let alone calculate with anything like precision, whether nuclear power will prove more or less expensive, safe, clean or reliable than its rivals.

In the face of this uncertainty, a reasonable policy choice is to temporise. The Chinese, who have made a serious commitment to nuclear power and several other technologies, paused to learn the lessons of Fukushima, and now look set to go on as before. That sounds about right.

Has finance become a “false divinity in the world”? Pope Benedict XVI thinks so. “We see that the world of finance can dominate the human being,” he has said. “[It is] no longer an instrument to foster well-being… [it] becomes a power that oppresses, that almost demands worship.”

As well as warming the hearts of banker-haters everywhere, the Pope's criticism is well aimed. Not only did the finance industry's arrogance help spur crisis and recession, but there's something dangerous at the core of finance. The human good can all too easily be lost when people's past work and future hopes are expressed in purely monetary terms.

In the Old Testament, the ancient Israelites were warned that too rigid a view of financial obligations is cruel and socially divisive. Aristotle added another essential objection. The ancient Greek philosopher pointed out that monetary wealth can keep on increasing forever — unlike our appetite for the things that money can buy. Yet while the worldly infinity of finance is alluring, it is ultimately false. Money has no human meaning on its own, but only when it serves a meaningful purpose.

The risks of inhumane finance may be eternal, but the Pope is also alluding to a more modern problem – the treatment of finance as a sort of god, and financiers as its priests. Consider four manifestations of the quasi-religious approach.

First, the magical expectations of finance. Too many people, and too many governments, imagine that some arrangement of the financial system — this monetary and fiscal policy mix, that sort of mortgage, this stock market, that collection of derivatives — will generate durable wealth or economic justice.

Second, think of the awe which surrounds the industry. The economic forecasts of financial professional are rarely right, but they receive the sort of respect once given to (equally inaccurate) oracles of divinity. The pronouncements of leading financiers, from George Soros to Warren Buffett, are taken seriously simply because these people have made lots of money in the financial markets. Political leaders tremble at the judgements of financial markets.

Third, consider the treatment of central banking as an activity beyond normal human understanding. A few decades ago, these financial practitioners were considered too elevated to be politically accountable. More recently, faith in central bank independence has been shaken: but it has not been destroyed by their abysmal record before the financial crisis. Indeed, Ben Bernanke and his peers have been given more power — and only a little more supervision from the mere mortals who have won elections.

Finally, despite much anti-banker rhetoric, the world continues to shower its own rewards on the high priests of finance. Thomas Philippon, a professor at New York University, has shown that the share of US national income dedicated to finance has fallen only slightly since the crisis, when it was at its highest since records began in 1865. The profession's leaders are amazingly well paid. The average income per head at Goldman Sachs in 2011, a grim year for the leading investment bank, was $354,000, or about nine times higher than the national average. Philippon estimates that about a quarter of the financiers' total income is unmerited. I suspect he is much too kind to the financial world.

In an ethical economy, none of this is right. Money can seem to make money for a while, but no amount of financial alchemy can generate real wealth. Financial professionals and financial markets are fallible. Central banking is inherently political. And the temple offerings to finance, in the form of inflated salaries, are excessive.

Still, finance should not be condemned as entirely evil. The modern industrial economy relies on money, credit and the hurly burly of investment to function. For all its flaws, the current financial system is more efficient and flexible than alternative means of gathering and allocating economic resources such as barter or rationing. At its best, and when it works, the business of banking and investment promotes the common good: it creates solidarity among savers and borrowers and rewards both daring and prudence. Lloyd Blankfein, chairman of Goldman Sachs was not entirely wrong to claim that his firm did “God's work”.

Indeed, at the bottom of the economic ladder, people need more, not less, finance. Financial inclusion of the sort endorsed by the G20 finance ministers last week is desirable. But at the top of the ladder, the industry needs what students of religion call desacralisation. The modern incarnation of the Israelites' golden calf should be stripped of the trappings of holiness. It is better for finance to serve the genuine economic good on earth than to aspire to an unmerited place in heaven.

An American, a Frenchman and a physicist were talking about some unusual weather. “It was twice as hot this afternoon as this morning”, said the American, “the temperature went up from 40 to 80 degrees.” The Frenchman interjected: “That's in Fahrenheit. In Celsius, it was six times hotter.” The physicist was scornful. “On the only really scientific measure, the Kelvin scale, the increase was a piffling 5 percent.”

Who's right? Well, all the measures are accurate and it certainly was hotter. But no single ratio – whether twice, six times or 5 percent – captures just how much hotter it actually felt. The feeling of hotness, like the feelings of pain or anger, cannot be measured with genuine precision.

It is the same for the feeling of prosperity – any measure will be arbitrary and quite possibly misleading. Consider gross domestic product, the most common index of economic success. GDP is the sum of spending on everything in the economy, from shoes to shoe-shines, from cars to child care. In comparing countries with each other or over time, GDP is usually adjusted for inflation to calculate what is ambitiously called “real GDP”. It is then often divided by the population, creating “real GDP per person”. This is usually measured in “constant dollars” and, for 2011 in the United States, becomes $43,149 of 2005 dollars.

Economists recognise that GDP is far from perfect. In 2009, a French government commission suggested that it should be augmented by measures of the distribution of wealth, environmental sustainability and “quality of life”. The Human Development Index , which is widely used by the United Nations, combines GDP with life expectancy and years of schooling.

These modifications are welcome, but they fail to correct GDP's main weakness – that is what might be called the fallacy of precision. The human meaning of prosperity simply cannot be reduced to numbers. Supposedly exact measures generally confuse more than they illuminate.

My rejection of quantification is anathema to most economists, who fancy themselves to be hard scientists. It also goes against utilitarianism, economists' favourite philosophy, which claims all decisions can be reduced to numerical comparisons.

But consider an example: real GDP per person in the United States is up 103 percent since 1971. That sounds basically right: overall, Americans are substantially richer than they were four decades ago. The improvements include a 12 percent increase in life expectancy at birth, the shift from clunky black-and-white to sleek colour television and the introduction of the Internet into more than 70 percent of households. The gains far outweigh the losses, such as a 26 percent fall in the number of highway miles per resident.

The exact number, though, is a fiction. There is no way to assign a weight to each of the gains and losses, and no reason to assume that GDP, which measures the inflation-adjusted price of the various goods and services, is a particularly meaningful summation.

Happiness economists try to dodge the problem by looking for a measurable and meaningful number in people's feelings. They claim subjective satisfaction can be counted up, simply by asking people to rate their happiness on a scale of, say, 1 to 5. The approach has many problems, one of which is that it doesn't make any sense to say happiness has increased by, say, 12 percent.

Emotions just don't work that way. George may love his current girlfriend more than his ex, but it's only a figure of speech to say he loves her twice as much. Similarly, it makes no sense to say we are twice as happy as our parents or 12 percent happier than we were a half a decade ago.

GDP and similar measures can be quite helpful rough indicators, especially for poor countries. For example, the Chinese government aims at 8 percent annual real GDP increase – that rate creates jobs without putting excessive strain on society. But the authorities in Beijing should be careful, for the precision is spurious. Sometime soon, the right GDP growth number will be lower. And when China gets rich enough, no measure of wealth will provide much insight.

Look at the International Monetary Fund's calculation that GDP per person was 27 percent lower in France than in the United States in 2011. The exactitude is ridiculous and the basic conclusion, that Americans are substantially richer than French people, is silly. The countries are both rich and modern, just in somewhat different, incommensurate ways. France has cheaper medical care, longer holidays and better mass transit and bakeries. The United States has bigger houses and more cars per person.

Numbers are seductive, so economists, politicians and pundits tend to fret over every tenth of a percentage point of GDP. But it is easy to exaggerate the importance of incremental changes in measures of this sort. It would be better to stop striving for precision. Or at least to cut back by 92.4 percent.

Nothing stimulates anti-capitalist feelings like large sums of money changing hands in the hope of huge profits. A recent example: the prospect that Facebook could be worth some $100 billion to its shareholders. The website's users might prefer less advertising and a lower valuation. But no one asked them. This inspired my Reuters colleague Paul Smalera to suggest that Facebook go co-op. Smalera won't get his way, but he's right to wonder whether the hunt for shareholder profits makes the world a better place.

In modern economies, most companies are supposed to be run for the benefit of the providers of equity capital, the shareholders, considered co-owners. Cooperatives and mutuals are owned by and supposed to be run for different groups: customers (the Cooperative Wholesale Society in the UK and American credit unions), suppliers (Sunkist citrus growers in the United States) or workers (the Mondragon group of companies in Spain and the UK retailer John Lewis).

The original thinking behind almost all these organisation was idealistic, even utopian: greedy capitalists had polluted the economy. Their exclusion would help promote the best aspects of human nature.

The idealism has not borne rich fruit. Co-ops and mutually owned enterprises (another name for this type of organisation) do not play a big role in the industrial economy. In the United States, the 100 largest employee-owned companies now account for only 0.5 percent of all workers, according to data from the National Center for Employee Ownership. Mutuality is doing less badly elsewhere – the largest dairy in India is a cooperative – but around the world, the movement's boosters are losing their power.

The idealism and the lack of success are related. Cooperatives were designed without much thought about what would happen when managers and workers lose their initial energy and enthusiasm. Outside oversight was scanty. The founders promoted corporate cultures which became more complacent than collaborative. Managers were weak, and companies stagnated.

Yet the limited success of the cooperative movement does not equate to a resounding triumph for its ideological opposite – the shareholder value cult. If profits were all that mattered for the economy, then more than a quarter of all American workers would not be employed by enterprises that function, often quite well, without profit motive – 17 percent by governments and another 11 percent by private, not-for-profit, organisations.

Indeed, something like the cooperative spirit can thrive within profit-seeking companies. Workers think more about doing a good job for their team, and for their customers, and don't obsess about the bottom line. They may behave this way for unselfish reasons. But self-interest can also make them focus on the opinion of bosses, who like teamwork, more than on returns to shareholders.

So neither cooperatives nor shareholders hold the secret to modern economic success. Profits for shareholders are less important than either their enemies or their fans would like to believe.

But shareholders do matter. Facebook is a case in point. Without the ability to raise money from outsiders, the company wouldn't have developed so fast. Without the discipline provided by the search for profits, its workers could have spent too much time developing user-friendly features, for example, at the risk of leaving the website clever but broke.

Still, Smalera has a point. Exaggerated profit maximisation has made social networking less social. Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg seems to be aware of the danger of too much profit-seeking. Like many media magnates before him, he will take super voting-rights, in his case to ensure the company stays loyal to its “social mission – to make the world more open and connected ”.

A more cooperative corporate structure might be preferable to the trust-Zuckerberg arrangement. But the need for less aggressive shareholders is greater in finance than it is in media. Mutuality is the most natural structure for banks and insurers. Since their funds come directly from depositors, they don't need to raise capital from outside shareholders. Arbitrating the conflicting desires of savers and borrowers should be enough to keep management busy, honest and efficient. As recently as three decades ago the financial system in Europe was mostly not-for-profit, and mutuals also played a major role in the United States.

Promoters of demutualisation said private shareholders would bring capital and discipline, but there was no good reason to change the old structures. Indeed, the introduction of the culture of profits into formerly mutual institutions was a significant contributor to the recent financial crisis. Such banks proved easy prey to the schemes of greedy schemers.

In organising the economy, greedy schemers and utopian dreamers are not the only alternatives. Like well-run government agencies and prudent shareholder-owned companies, well-designed cooperatives can be efficient servants of the common good. Hard-headed bankers and regulators should catch on.